Design specifications of the MkI and MkII PBR's follow.
Click on the thumbnail photo to enlarge:
The Patrol Boat River (PBR):
The above photo is courtesty of Doug Lindsey (YRBM 17)
Alpha boats like mine were used at times in operations
with PBR's. The above shot of the PBR's behind me was taken in Nha Be in the summer
of 1969.
Cecil H. Martin's PBR 110 of RivDiv 531
The PBR in the sunset and the above B&W photo showing a Huey
providing air support during a firing run by several PBR's were taken by PH1 Ed Shinton
and are courtesy of Albert Moore and the Mobile Riverine Force Association.
History of the PBR in Vietnam
River Patrol
The great strategic and economic importance of South Vietnam's extensive inland waterways
made it clear from the beginning of the war that the Navy would be in the front rank of
the allied forces. Laced by 3,000 nautical miles of rivers, canals, and smaller streams,
the fertile Mekong Delta south of Saigon, where the largest segment of South Vietnam
population lived, constituted the country's rice bowl. Northward along the coast to the
DMZ, sizable rivers stretched inland past vital population centers such as the old
imperial capital of Hue. Throughout the country the road and rail system was rudimentary
while the waterways provided ready access to the most important resources. The side that
controlled the rivers and canals controlled the heart of South Vietnam. U.S. naval leaders
were determined that allied forces would command these waterways when they established the
River Patrol Force (Task Force 116) on 18 December 1965. From then until March 1966, the
Navy procured river patrol boats (PBR) in the United States, prepared the crews at the
Coronado, California, and Mare Island, California, training centers, and deployed the
units to Southeast Asia for Operation Game Warden. On 15 March 1966 the River Patrol Force
was also designated River Patrol Squadron 5 for administrative and supply purposes. By 31
August 1968, the force consisted of five river divisions, each controlling two 10-boat
sections that operated from combat bases along the major rivers or from ships positioned
in the rivers. The Navy reconditioned each of the ships so they could serve as floating
base facilities for a PBR section and a helicopter detachment.
River Patrol Force Dispositions
River Division 51 Can Tho/Binh Thuy
River Division 52 Sa Dec (later Vinh Long)
River Division 53 My Tho
River Division 54 Nha Be River
Division 55 Danang
Support Ships -- 1966
Belle Grove (LSD 2)
Comstock (LSD 19)
Floyd County (LST 762)
Jennings County (LST 846)
Tortuga (LSD 26)
1967-1968
Garrett County (LST 786)
Harnett County (LST 821)
Hunterdon County (LST 838)
Jennings County (LST 846)
The PBR, the ubiquitous workhorse of the River Patrol Force, was manned by a crew of four
bluejackets, equipped with a Pathfinder surface radar and two radios, and commonly armed
with two twin- mounted .50-caliber machine guns forward, M-60 machine guns (or a grenade
launcher) port and starboard amidship, and a .50-caliber aft. The initial version of the
boat, the Mark I, performed well in river patrol operations but was plagued with continual
fouling of its water-jet engines by weeds and other detritus. In addition, when Vietnamese
sampans came alongside for inspection they often damaged the fragile fiberglass hull of
the PBRs. New Mark IIs, first deployed to the delta in December 1966, brought improved Jacuzzi jet pumps, which reduced fouling and
increased speed from 25 to 29 knots, and more durable aluminum gunwales. Task Force 116
also employed the experimental patrol air cushion vehicle (PACV), three of which operated
in the Mekong Delta during 1966 and 1967 as PACV Division 107. During 1968, the PACVs
deployed to the Danang area as Coastal Division 17. Although able to move with great speed
over shallow, marshy areas, such as in the Plain of Reeds, the PACVs proved to be too
noisy and too mechanically sophisticated for riverine war in South Vietnam. After the Tet
emergency, the craft were shipped back to the United States for reevaluation.
A key component of the Game Warden operation was its air support element. Initially, the
Army deployed detachments of two UH-1B Iroquois helicopters and their crews to PBR bases
and river-based LSTs. Beginning in August 1966, however, air crews from the Navy's
Helicopter Support Squadron 1 replaced the Army personnel. Then on 1 April 1967, the Navy
activated Helicopter Attack (Light) Squadron (HAL) 3 at Vung Tau with responsibility for
providing Task Force 116 with aerial fire support, observation, and medical evacuation. By
September 1968, the 421-man "Seawolf" squadron controlled detachments of two
helicopters each at Nha Be, Binh Thuy, Dong Tom, Rach Gia, Vinh Long, and on board three
LSTs stationed in the larger rivers of the Mekong Delta. The Bell UH-1B "Hueys,"
armed variously with 2.75-inch rockets; .50-caliber, 60-millimeter, and 7.62-millimeter
machine guns; grenades; and small arms, were a powerful and mobile complement to the Game
Warden surface units.
The River Patrol Force commander led other naval forces, including the highly trained and
skilled SEALs. By mid-1968, the 211-man SEAL Team 1, based at Coronado, fielded twelve
14-man platoons, each composed of two squads. Generally four or five of the platoons at
any given time were deployed to South Vietnam, where one or two of them served with the
special operations force in Danang and another three operated from Nha Be as Detachment
GOLF in support of the Task Force 116 campaign in the Rung Sat Special Zone. Beginning in
early 1967, the Atlantic Fleet's SEAL Team 2 provided another three platoons, two of which
were stationed with the Game Warden units at Can Tho. These units launched SEAL operations
in the central delta area. Although focused primarily on the areas to the south and west
of Saigon, the SEAL's also mounted operations in the I and II Corps Tactical Zones.
These elite naval commando units carried out day and night ambushes, hit and run raids,
reconnaissance patrols, salvage dives, and special intelligence operations. Normally
operating in six-man squads, the SEALs used landing craft, SEAL team assault boats (STAB),
26-foot armored trimarans, PBRs, sampans, and helicopters for transportation to and from
their target areas. Mobile, versatile, and extremely effective in their dangerous work,
the SEALs were a valuable fighting force in the riverine environment of Vietnam.
Mine clearance forces also were essential to the security of Vietnam's waterways. Nowhere
was this more crucial than on the rivers near Saigon, the country's most vital port. Viet
Cong mining of the main shipping channel, the Long Tau River, which wound its way through
the Rung Sat Special Zone south of the capital, could have had a devastating effect on the
war effort. Consequently, on 20 May 1966, the Navy established Mine Squadron 11,
Detachment Alpha (Mine Division 112 after May 1968) at Nha Be, under Commander Task Force
116. From 1966 until mid-1968, the minesweeping detachment operated 12 or 13 minesweeping
boats (MSB) reactivated in the United States and shipped to Southeast Asia. The 57-foot,
fiberglass-hulled vessels were armed with machine guns and grenade launchers and carried
surface radars and minesweeping gear for clearing explosives from the key waterways. The Navy also deployed
three-boat subordinate units to Danang and Cam Ranh Bay. Detachment Alpha's strength
increased in July 1967 when the first of six mechanized landing craft (LCM(M)) that were
specially configured to sweep mines arrived at Nha Be.
Game Warden operations got underway in early 1966. Naval leaders set out to secure the
vital water passages through the Rung Sat and to establish patrols on the large Mekong
Delta rivers. On these latter waterways, the Viet Cong transported arms and supplies
brought in from Cambodia, shifted guerrilla units, and taxed the population. The Navy
created two separate task groups to direct operations in the respective areas.
On 26 March 1966, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine, and South Vietnamese forces kicked off Operation
Jackstay, the war's first major action in the Rung Sat. PBR units (including one section
from Tortuga), minesweeping boats from Nha Be, SEAL's, and helicopters operated together
to sweep the area. At the end of the 12-day effort, the allies had killed or captured 69
of the enemy; destroyed Viet Cong supply bases, training sites, and other logistical
facilities; and, at least for a time, restricted enemy movement in the zone.
The enemy, however, remained a potent threat. In one month, August 1966, Viet Cong mines
in the Long Tau heavily damaged SS Baton Rouge Victory, a Vietnamese Navy motor launch
minesweeper, and MSB 54. In November, a Viet Cong mine sank MSB 54. And on the last day of
the year, American forces discovered a Soviet-made contact mine in the shipping channel.
The Americans and the South Vietnamese intensified minesweeping operations and the enemy
continued to fight back. In February 1967 Communist recoilless rifle fire and mines
destroyed MSB 45 and heavily damaged MSB 49. By the spring of 1967 the rapid buildup of
allied forces in the Rung Sat area, the refinement of tactics, and improvement of weapon
systems began to reduce enemy effectiveness. During the year Vietnamese Regional Force and
U.S. Army 9th Division troops conducted aggressive sweeps ashore in coordination with the
helicopter, PBR, and MSB units; the better equipped LCM(M)s augmented the minesweeping
force at Nha Be. SEALs began sowing mines throughout enemy-held areas, and both PBRs and
MSBs added rapid-fire, 40-millimeter grenade launchers to their armament. From mid-1967 to
mid-1968, the Viet Cong continued to ambush shipping on the Long Tau with mines,
122-millimeter rockets, rocket-propelled grenades, recoilless rifles, machine guns, and
small arms. Quick action by allied reaction forces, however, often cut short these
assaults. Thus, ship damage and personnel casualties were relatively light. Other attacks
never occurred because PBR and SEAL patrols upset enemy plans or the MSBs and LCM(M)s
swept up mines. Consequently, the Communists were unable to sever the vital lifeline to Saigon, even when their forces were fighting for
survival during the Tet and post-Tet battles of 1968.
Game Warden operations in the central reaches of the Mekong Delta began on 8 May 1966 when
PBR River Section 511 of River Division 51 at Can Tho patroled a stretch of the Bassac
River. Soon afterward, other units initiated surveillance of the upper Mekong and the My
Tho, Ham Luong, and Co Chien arms of the mighty river that emptied into the South China
Sea.
In two-boat random patrols Task Force 116 sailors checked the cargo and identity papers of
junks and sampans plying the waterways, set up night ambushes at suspected enemy crossing
points, supported the SEALs with gunfire and transportation, and enforced curfew
restrictions in their sector, usually no more than 35 nautical miles from the base.
Game Warden operations in the central delta registered only modest success from 1966 to
1968. Only 140 PBRs were on station to patrol many miles of river and canal. As a result,
they could canvass only the larger waterways. Still, the Task Force 116 patrol forced the
Viet Cong to divert troops and other resources to defense and to resort to less efficient
transportation on smaller rivers and canals. During 1966 the task force refined its
tactics, evaluated the performance of its boats and weapons in combat, and regularized its
operational procedures. At the same time naval leaders repositioned the LSD and LST
support ships inland because heavy seas at the river mouths made operations from there
difficult. The year 1967 opened with the accidental loss of a PBR during launching
operations from Jennings County and the first combat loss of a river patrol boat. These
events foreshadowed a busy and dangerous year for the Game Warden sailors who boarded over
400,000 vessels and inspected them for enemy personnel and contraband. In the process, the
River Patrol Force destroyed, damaged, or captured over 2,000 Viet Cong craft and killed,
wounded, or captured over 1,400 of the enemy. However, the U.S. Navy suffered the loss of
39 officers and men killed, 366 wounded, and 9 missing in battle.
The Tet Offensive of 1968 fully engaged Task Force 116. Because of their firepower and
mobility, the PBRs stiffened the defenses of numerous delta cities and towns that were
under siege by the enemy. The river patrol boat units were key elements in the successful
allied stands at My Tho, Ben Tre, Chau Doc, Tra Vinh, and Can Tho. The enemy prevailed
only at Vinh Long, where the Viet Cong overran the PBR base forcing the defenders to
withdraw to Garrett County. Despite this and a few other temporary setbacks, Task Force
116 reestablished firm control of the major delta rivers by mid-year and helped cut short
the Viet Cong attacks on Saigon.
The river sailors also gave critical support to allied forces fighting to contain the
enemy surge in I Corps. From September to October 1967, River Section 521 and Hunterdon
County deployed to the river areas south of Danang and to Cau Hai Bay near Hue. PBR units
operated permanently in the northern reaches of South Vietnam after 24 February 1968, when
COMNAVFORV established Task Force Clearwater, under the operational control of the
Commanding General III Marine Amphibious Force. The mission of the task force was to
secure the Perfume River (which gave access to Hue from the sea) and the Cua Viet River.
The Task Force eased supply efforts to American forces arrayed along the DMZ and holding
the besieged outpost at Khe Sanh. Home for the task force headquarters in I
corps was Mobile Base I,
a floating barge complex stationed first at Tan My and later at Cua Viet. Because heavily armed North Vietnamese
Army units were presented in this region, COMNAVFORV strengthened the 20-boat PBR task
force with monitors, armored river craft, PACVs, and landing craft minesweepers. Task
Force Clearwater could also call on helicopter, attack aircraft, artillery, naval gunfire,
and ground troop support from other units in the I Corps region. Convoys bristling with
weaponry were required to maintain the line of communication with forward combat units.
The naval forces carried out equally vital minesweeping and patroling operations. During
1968, Task Force Clearwater's support was crucial to the successful defense of Khe Sanh, the recapture of Hue, and the defeat of the enemy
offensive in I Corps.
